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CHAPTER 11

FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
IN BANKRUPTCY
AND INSOLVENCY
JOHN A. E. POTTOW

I.

INTRODUCTION

ALTHOUGH mentioned nowhere in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, "fiduciary duties'' play a
central role in guiding the administration of an insolvent debtor's assets. The chief actor
doing that administration is the bankruptcy trustee, who is subject to a host of duties,
some of which are unquestionably fiduciary. One of the greatest challenges a bankruptcy
trustee faces in the discharge of these duties, however, is the widely divergent interests of
the heterogeneous creditor constituency. Regarding that difficulty, fiduciary law offers
varying degrees of help to bankruptcy trustees in their unenviable task. Even when fiduciary law rears its head with respect to these conflicts, disagreement is rife in the case law
regarding its mandate, with courts often repairing to broad platitudes. 1 Yet the system
still seems to work tolerably, in spite of all this chaos, with a pragmatic quasi-implicit
recognition that conflicted interests are just endemic to bankruptcy.
This chapter will canvass the bankruptcy trustee's duties, which are triggered by virtue
of appointment in a case. It focuses on the fiduciary duties of care and especially loyalty,
given these inescapable conflicts, proceeding as follows. First, it offers a bankruptcy law
primer on the role of the trustee and debtor-in-possession to enable more critical understanding of the fiduciary duty discussion to follow. Second, it discusses the trustee's
various duties, focusing first on the degree to which they can be characterized as fiduciary, and then on the specific content of the duties of care and loyalty. The exquisite loyalty
challenges the trustee faces are explored in some depth, broken into a taxonomy of

1

See, e.g., In re AFI Holding, Inc., 530 F.3d 832, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]rustee 'may not be the representative of any particular creditor, but must represent all. ... '").
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"external" duties to the debtor's estate broadly and "internal" duties to the differing classes
of creditors therein (with the conflicts of these differing classes illustrated in even greater
detail). The analysis shows that the help fiduciary law can provide is varying. Next, this
chapter explains the byzantine protective remedies doctrines trustees face from litigation that implicitly recognize the difficulty of their task given these conflicts. Finally, it
comments upon miscellaneous additional duties of the trustee and reflects upon the
unique challenges the debtor-in-possession faces with its duty of loyalty, suggesting the
bankruptcy system has pragmatic structural safeguards that not only mitigate some of
these tensions but may even provide a model for conflict-laden fiduciaries elsewhere.

II.

BANKRUPTCY PRIMER

To understand the various doctrines and rules affecting fiduciary responsibilities in
bankruptcy, a quick bankruptcy terrain overview is required. One overarching consideration at the outset is that bankruptcy law is designed as a collective resolution
mechanism: it corrals multiple claimants on a debtor's property into one compulsory
proceeding, and so much ofits design is about centralizing control over unruly creditors
(anddebtors). 2
The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers several legal consequences in so centralizing multiple disputes. First, it imposes an automatic stay on any legal and extralegal
collection activities. 3 Second, it creates an "estate" of all the debtor's property, divesting
the debtor of control over the res, albeit with title remaining in the debtor's name. 4 Third,
it assigns control of the estate to the "trustee:' who has authority under various provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code to oversee these assets. 5 The trustee will be the focus of our
attention in this analysis of fiduciary duties.
The Bankruptcy Code also contains various chapters for specific types of proceedings.
The most relevant include chapters 7, 11, and 13.
Chapter 7 is the "primordial" disposition of debtor assets: the trustee's job is to inventory the assets, review claims filed against the estate, carve out exempt assets for return
to the debtor, and pay out dividends to unsecured creditors based on the liquidation of
nonexempt property. 6 The Code specifies a hierarchy of creditor claims, which can generally be grouped into four classes: secured, priority unsecured, general unsecured, and
subordinated. 7
Chapter 11 is a reorganization proceeding, chiefly for businesses, in which the debtor
proposes voluntary debt concessions to creditors, who are separated into classes and
subjected to supermajoritarian voting rules for approving (or vetoing) a plan of

2

3
5

See generally Thomas Jackson, Toe Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986).
4 Id. § 541.
5 See id. §§ 702, 704, 1104, 1106, 1302.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
7 Id. §§ 506, 507, 510.
See id. §§ 701 et seq.
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reorganization. 8 (One requirement of Chapter 11 is a minimum dividend not falling
below what would be achieved in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. 9 )
Chapter 13 is a special reorganization for individual debtors, where they may propose
their own repayment plan spanning three to five years, paying over net income to their
creditors but retaining all their property-including nonexempt property that otherwise
would be liquidated in a Chapter 7-in exchange for debt discharge at plan completion. 10
Although the trustee is primarily regulated in Chapter 7, separate provisions of the Code
prescribe special rules for trustees in Chapters 11 and 13. 11
The identity of the trustee depends upon under which chapter the debtor files. In
Chapter 7 proceedings, the trustee at the start of the case is technically the "interim"
trustee, who is selected usually randomly from a panel mostly composed of bankruptcy lawyers established by the U.S. Trustee's Office. 12 (The U.S. Trustee is a federal
Department of Justice official, like a U.S. Attorney, who oversees bankruptcy cases
proceeding in his or her district and reports to the D.C.-based "Executive Office of the
United States Trustee" (EOUST) ). 13 Although nominally creditors can vote for a trustee,
the interim trustee functionally becomes the trustee upon creditor nonvote. 14
In Chapter 13, because the debtor will be languishing in bankruptcy for three to five
years, control of property stays with the debtor, who revests in the estate property upon
plan confirmation. 15 There is also an officer, also appointed by the U.S. Trustee, called
the "Standing Trustee" for the district. 16 As a logistical matter, the debtor's monthly
payments are funneled through the Standing Trustee's Office, although some secured
creditors (e.g., mortgagees) are often paid directly, "outside" the plan. 17
In Chapter 11, U.S. law demonstrates its remarkable vision, subject to increasing
global replication: the "debtor-in-possession" (DIP) concept. 18 Under the DIP model, no
trustee is appointed; the debtor remains in control of its property and its estate, vesting
in most-but importantly, not all-of the trustee's responsibilities. 19 There is some debate
in bankruptcy literature whether the DIP is a separate entity from the debtor or just the
debtor with additional responsibilities and powers, but the point remains that the DIP
runs the show. 20 Under certain circumstances, the DIP can be displaced and an external
trustee appointed (generally known as a debtor "out of possession"), but those cases are
rare. 21 The U.S. experience serves as marked contrast to many other systems of insolvency, such as U.K. "administration:' in which the first thing that happens upon filing is

10 Id. §§ 1325, 1328.
9 Id. § 1129(a)(7),
Id. §§ 1124, 1129.
12
See id.§§ 704, 1106, 1302.
Id. §§ 322(b)(1), 701.
13 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 581, 586; 28 C.F.R. §§ 58.1 et seq.
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702.
15 Id.§ 1327(b).
16 28 U.S.C. § 586(b); 11 U.S.C. § 1302.
17 See, e.g., In re Clay, 339 B.R. 784,789 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (describing process).
18 11 U.S.C. § 1107.
19 Id. § 1106.
20 See Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11, 38 Wayne L.
Rev. 1323, 1331 (1992) (chronicling growing "resistance" to new entity theory).
21 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (focusing specifically on beneficiaries of the estate, not broader considerations of
public interest).
8

11
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divestiture of authority of debtor's management and appointment of the British analogue
to a trustee. 22
One final point in this bankruptcy law primer: the trustee (and DIP in Chapter 11)
enjoys special powers under federal bankruptcy law usually referred to as "avoiding
powers?' Generally, federal bankruptcy law takes state law property and contract rights
as it finds them, although subject to an important caveat of countervailing federal bankruptcy purposes. 23 That said, the Code confers various instances of redistributive power
that allow trustees to claw back some transactions. For example, an unsecured creditor
who receives an eve-of-bankruptcy (usually ninety days) transfer of debtor property
that allows a better payout than would otherwise be achieved through pro rata distribution has received a "voidable preference:• which the trustee can choose to rescind for the
benefit of the estate. 24 Thus, DIPs in Chapter 11 can suddenly find themselves armed
with powers to undo transactions with their creditors pursuant to laws that exist only in
federal bankruptcy cases.
One of the most significant of these powers pertaining to payment status is what is
colloquially called the "strong-arm" clause, which allows trustees to pick off unperfected
liens on estate collateral. 25 A flawed security interest, if avoided under the strong-arm
power, has the lien transferred to the estate with the consequence of rendering the
erstwhile secured creditor a general unsecured creditor, entitled only to whatever meager
dividend that trickles down to the unwashed. 26 The strong-arm clause implicates a
classic internal duty ofloyalty tension that will be discussed in the following part.

Ill. TRUSTEE DUTIES
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• .. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• .. ••••••••••••••••••••uo,,,ouo,,,,,,,,,,,,,ooou,,, .. ,

A. Classification: Fiduciary, Non-Fiduciary, and
Anti-Fiduciary Obligations
The trustee faces a congeries of duties under the Bankruptcy Code, which contains a
fulsome list of responsibilities under Section 704 (a provision too long to reproduce
here). 27 None of these are explicitly described as "fiduciary:' but commentators have
previously argued that at least some are. For example, retired bankruptcy judge (and
frequent author) Steven Rhodes divides trustees' obligations into "fiduciary'' obligations,
owed to the "bankruptcy court and the parties in cases in which the trustee serves," and
"institutional" obligations, owed "to the bankruptcy process itself:' a serviceable if

Insolvency Act 1986 c. 45, Schedule B1, ,, 1, 10, 59(1), 61, and 64 (UK).
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979).
24 11 U.S.C. § 547,
25 Id. § 544.
26 Id. § 550.
27 11 U.S.C. § 704. Section 704 is not exhaustive. The trustee has myriad other obligations scattered
throughout other Code provisions. See, e.g., id. § 341.
22
23
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slightly overbroad typology. 28 While I agree with Rhodes that only some are fiduciary,
I think analyzing the other obligations is equally as important because some are not just
neutral, but thrust trustees into an antagonistic posture with the natural beneficiaries
to whom they owe a duty of loyalty. Thus, my preferred sorting would be to say that the
trustee has fiduciary, non-fiduciary, and (at the risk of being insufferable) "anti-fiduciary"
obligations under the Code.
1.

Non-Fiduciary Duties

Let's start with non-fiduciary duties. Although one can debate the correct labeling and
classification, some obligations, while important, are clearly not fiduciary. For example,
furnishing notice to certain domestic support creditors or transferring patients to health
care facilities falls toward the ministerial/administrative end of a continuum building
up to fiduciary obligations. 29
2.

Fiduciary Duties

As for what I would consider fiduciary duties, the absence of an explicit label of "fiduciary"
does not undermine the Code's language that is clearly amenable to trigger such responsibility, such as the obligation "to be accountable for all property received." 30 Even neutralsounding assignments, such as the primary instruction to "collect and reduce to money
the property of the estate for which such trustee serves;' can be interpreted-as this one
indeed has by courts-to impress upon trustees a fiduciary role. 31
The corollary is that some obligations that might sound like they are fiduciary "in the air"
are not, upon closer inspection, in light of the trustee's primary obligation to administer
an estate. Consider perhaps the most vivid one from the debtor's perspective-the
obligation "if advisable, to oppose the debtor's discharge." 32 One could conceive of this
as yet another obligation of the trustee to help creditors, and so fully consonant with the
trustee's role as a fiduciary to creditors seeking collection. But that analysis is too quick,
because the trustee has no obligation to improve the general welfare of creditors (they
are not his general wards), nor even to cajole the debtor to offer voluntary repayments to
creditors whose debts will be discharged by operation of federal law.
Rather, the trustee has a fiduciary obligation to creditors limited to the property of the
estate; what the debtor does in a post-bankruptcy world is of no concern to the trustee.
By contrast, creditors may well care, because a debtor whose discharge is denied not
only contributes bankruptcy estate property to the creditors but also continues to have a
legal obligation to pay post-bankruptcy. On the other hand, creditors with an uncollectible
28 Steven W. Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee,
So Am. Bankr. L.J.147, 147-148 (2006). Others use different labels. Elizabeth H. McCullough, Bankruptcy
Trustee Liability: Is There a Method in the Madness?, 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev.153, 162 (2011) (labeling
some "functionary").
29 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(10), (12).
30 Id.§ (a)(2).
31 Id.§ (a)(1). See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 12 (2000);
cf. Unif. Trust Code § 809 (Unif. Law Comm'n 2000) ( duty to control trust property).
32 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(6).
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debtor don't want their dividends reduced by the trustee's (estate-compensated) publicspirited pursuit of a discharge denial motion that yields them no more money. The trustee
is thus given specific discretion to determine whether discharge opposition is "advisable,"
which some courts have interpreted to mean the trustee can let a discharge investigation
drop if the creditors don't care (or have settled with the debtor for a compromise
payment), while others have held an objection cannot be dropped if creditors have been
bought off (at the very least, say these courts, it must be reported to the U.S. Trustee's
Office). 33 "No-drop" courts clearly rely on something beyond a trustee's fiduciary
obligation to creditors, making the trustee a hybrid fiduciary/non-fiduciary to creditors
under Section 704.3 4 Thus, some obligations might be considered "faux fiduciary:'

3. Anti-Fiduciary Duties
But non- (or faux-) fiduciary obligations are not the end of the matter, as some obligations are clearly antithetical to the creditors, the ostensible beneficiaries of the trustee's
fiduciary duties. These might be considered "anti-fiduciary." Consider Section 704(a)
(4)'s instruction that "if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object
to the allowance of any claim that is improper."35 Few creditors relish the prospect of the
trustee sniffing around their claims, let alone objecting, which situates the usually supportive trustee in a sometimes adversarial posture. This necessary awkwardness underscores the intrinsically conflicting nature of the multiparty nature of bankruptcy: when
there is collective resolution of a debtor's general default, a menagerie of heterogeneous
creditors emerges. A creditor whose claim objection is sustained gets less money, which
trickles down to other co-creditors. Trustees thus find themselves sometimes opposed to
creditors they normally champion. 36
Appreciating the complexity of the trustee's duties, which are sometimes downright
anti-fiduciary in my characterization, do bankruptcy courts nonetheless generally tend
to consider them on the whole as triggering fiduciary obligations? Absolutely. Courts
repeatedly remark that trustees-and hence Chapter 11 DIPs-are "fiduciaries" who owe

33 Compare In re Dalen, 259 B.R. 586, 591 (Banlcr. W.D. Mich. 2001) (approving), with In re Levine,
287 B.R. 683, 701 (Banlcr. E.D. Mich. 2002) (disapproving). See generally U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Executive
Office for U.S. Trustees, Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees§ 4.G, 29 (2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo
/private_trustee/library/chaptero7/docs/forms/Ch7hbo702-2005.pdf [hereinafter Handbook] (instructing
trustee to forward information to U.S. Trustee).
34 See Rhodes, supra note 28, at 202-209 (opining trustees must "protect the integrity of the bankruptcy process").
35 u U.S.C. § 704(a)(4).
36 The conflict is only relevant in "intermediate" cases with some unsecured distribution. If the estate
is solvent and all creditors are getting fully paid, only the debtor cares about claims inflation, not the
trustee. And if the estate has no assets, the trustee also should not care about the proper calculation of
claims that will all be discharged without payment anyway. (The only reason for pursuing review of
claims in no asset cases would be trustee fee-churning. In re Riverside-Linden Investors, 925 F.2d 320, 322
(9th Cir. 1991).) Courts have settled on a pragmatic "prima facie" standard: if a claim looks prima fa.de
appropriate, there is no further investigation required absent party objection. E.g., In re Atcall, 284
B.R. 791, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002).
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traditional obligations of care and loyalty to the estate and its creditors. 37 Even the
professional canons concede many trustee obligations are fiduciary. 38 Accordingly,
while noting these complex nuances on the trustee's responsibilities, it is appropriate now
to consider the primary duties of care and loyalty and how they constrain the trustee,
flagging especially how the structural tension of the trustee as fiduciary/anti-fiduciary
manifests itselfwhen beneficiary interests conflict. 39

B. Content of the Duty of Care: Relative Clarity
As mentioned, characterization of trustee duties as "fiduciary" does not appear in the

Code, and so it is unsurprising the statute lacks explication of the duty of care. Indeed,
bankruptcy courts repeatedly reference non-Code "general" provisions of fiduciary law,
suggesting trustees are governed by a federal common law. The U.S. Supreme Court has
pronounced, "By the common law, every trustee or receiver of an estate has the duty of
exercising reasonable care in the custody of the fiduciary estate."40 This common law
standard, drawing from trust law, has been articulated as that required by "an ordinarily
prudent person:' 41
Common law fiduciary duties of care supplement statutory obligations imposed by
the Code. Courts emphasize Section 704 as a floor, not a ceiling, to the proper discharge
of bankruptcy trustees qua fiduciaries. "Beyond the statutory duties, bankruptcy
trustees owe to the beneficiaries of the estate the usual common law trust duties.... "42
Because the content of the duty of care is federal common law, courts have turned to
general principles, such as the Restatement of Trusts, to delineate its content.43 (There
are, however, some dissenters. 44) Finally, it should be noted that duty of care issues are
functionally regulated by the statutory "competence" requirement for trustees under
the Code.45 Thus, the real work typical duty of care litigation performs in regular trust
law is probably done offstage in insolvency, such as by the empaneling procedures of
the U.S. Trustee's office and administrative proceedings removing trustees, 46 which

E.g., Stalnaker v. DLC, Ltd., 376 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2004).
See NABT Canon of Ethics, Canon 2 (2005).
39 Some cases hold corporate DIPs only to a business judgment rule duty of care, e.g., In re Mirant
Corp., 348 B.R. 725, 744 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006), but this line has been criticized. See Kelch, supra note
20, at 1342 n.88.
40 United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 450 (1938). On trust law "prudence;' see
Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, this volume.
41 In re Ebel, 338 B.R. 862, 875 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2005).
42 In re Markos Gurnee P'ship, 182 B.R. 211,219 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
43 See, e.g., In re Ferrante, 51 F.3d 1473, 1479-1480 (9th Cir. 1995).
44 See In re Schipper, 933 F.zd 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to supplement Code's text).
45 11 U.S.C. § 321(a).
46 See 28 C.F.R. § 58.6; Case No. 05-0004, Decision by Acting Director Clifford J. White III, 6
(Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/rulesJegulations/admin_decisions/docs/caseo50004.htm
(four-month suspension for inadequate debtor investigation).
37

38
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are designed to police competence. 47 As such, duty of care cases raise few noteworthy
issues in insolvency law. 48

C. Content (and Beneficiaries) of the Duty of
Loyalty: Relative Chaos
The duty of loyalty raises far more complex (and intractable) issues in bankruptcy. As
previously mentioned, bankruptcy raises unique conflicts among claimants, all of whom
are ostensibly served by the trustee. The thornier those conflicts get, the less certainty
the fiduciary duty ofloyalty (or even impartiality) seems to provide courts. In considering these trustee's loyalty difficulties, it might be helpful first to distinguish "external"
from "internal" conflicts of trustee loyalty.
1.

External Conflicts: (Mostly) Clear Fiduciary Obligations

By "external" conflicts, I mean adversarial conflicts between a trustee himself and the
bankruptcy estate stakeholders. For example, a self-dealing trustee who profits on his
own account violates a duty ofloyalty to the beneficiaries.49 To guard against such temptations, the Code explicitly requires "disinterestedness" as an eligibility criterion to serve.50
This statutory requirement replicates the common law of trusts, 51 and Congress provides
extensive (and fairly rigid) definitional guidance on disinterestedness. 52 Even criminal
law is implicated 53
Case law, however, has glossed some flexibility on this statutory definition. Trustees, for
example, can serve in multiple related estates under certain circumstances, even if there
is a potential for cross-claims. 54 And trustees can, and often do, employ themselves as
lawyers for the bankruptcy estate. 55 (The requirement of disinterestedness also applies
to attorneys who seek to serve the estate, beyond whatever constraints are imposed by
apposite rules of professional conduct. 56 ) The DIP, of course, could never satisfy the
47 See In re Lowery, 215 B.R. 140, 141-142 (Bmkr. N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding trustee "obviously" competent "by virtue of being a member of the United States Trustee's panel").
48 Cf. Kelch, supra note 20, at 1340 ("In attempting to find ... a definition of the content of the fiduciary duty of the debtor in possession, the lack of any unified concept becomes evident.").
49 See In re San Juan Hotel Corp., 71 B.R. 413,423 (D.P.R. 1987), aff'd in part and reva in part on other
grounds, 847 F.zd 931,950 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding trustee's relative's freebie marriage reception on estate
property was "self-dealing" and "conflict of interest").
50 11 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).
51 In re Palm Coast, Matanza Shores Ltd P'ship, 101 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996).
52 11 u.s.c. § 101(14).
53 18 u.s.c. § 154.
54 See, e.g., In re Petters Co., Inc., 401 B.R. 391, 412 (Bmkr. D. Minn. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Banlcr.
P. 2009(c)(2)). Trust law provides analogous flexibility. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts§ 78 cmt.
(c)(7) (Am. Law Inst. 2003).
55 11 U.S.C. § 327(d); see also Rhodes, supra note 28, at 161 n.67 (referencing poll where 78% of trustees
reported employing themselves under Section 327(d)); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt.
(c)(5) (Am. Law Inst. 2003) (condoning self-employment).
56 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
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disinterestedness test, and so has no requirement of disinterestedness imposed.57 In
sum, the duty ofloyalty for "external" temptations to the trustees is largely what might
be expected, perhaps with some overspecificity accorded by the statutory strictures of
the Code. Fiduciary law (trusts) robustly supplements the Code, aided by the administrative apparatus of the EOUST.

Internal Conflicts: Divided Case Law with Uncertain
Fiduciary Obligations

2.

"Internal" loyalty issues raise different concerns that, if not unique, are somewhat
intrinsic to insolvency: how the trustee polices competing conflicts among the constitutive beneficiaries he serves. Three illustrative skirmishes demonstrate the difficulties
courts have deploying the duties ofloyalty and impartiality regarding the trustee's divergent
beneficiaries: secured creditor versus. unsecured creditor, unsecured creditor versus
unsecured creditor, and creditors generally versus the debtor.
To start, the trustee is supposed to be "impartial," in the language of trust law:
A Chapter 7 trustee occupies a unique position. He is charged with impartially administering the estate entrusted to him. He is the representative of all the creditors.... At
times he must propose action that may be detrimental to particular creditors or
oppose requests that may be favorable to others.58
Thus, bankruptcy judges are sympathetic to the competing demands on trustee loyalties. But this sympathy has not resulted in detailed specification in case law, just vague
incantations of impartiality. And trust law's translation of the duty of impartiality into
not, in fact, requiring impartiality but rather "due regard" for the divergent interests of
beneficiaries has not been picked up in bankruptcy (although I am doubtful it could
offer much help). 511 Rather, judicial solicitude for the trustee's plight simply manifests
itself in the diffuse generalization of the trustee's fiduciary duties being owed to
"the estate."60 The Supreme Court concurs that, in insolvency, a corporate DIP's fiduciary duties run expansively to "the corporation,,., including its shareholders and its
creditors. 61 As one commentator laments, "[T]he fiduciary duty that adheres to this
Cf. id.§ 1104(b) (permitting DIP's professionals to have previously represented debtor).
In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 268 B.R. 468, 473 (Banlcr. E.D. Va. 2001) (holding Code
requires "balance").
" See Robert H. Sitkoff & Jesse Dukeminier, Wills, 'frusts, and Estates 667 (10th ed. 2005). 'frust law's
duty of impartiality is implicated mostly in the principal-vs.-income beneficiaries tension. See Sitkoff,
supra note 40. My skepticism of its utility to bankruptcy is that in trust law there are (1) generally fewer
stakeholders and (2) a frequent workaround of explicit specification in the trust document itself of rules
for resolving/absolving conflicting duties. See also Uni£ 'frust Code§ 8o3 (Uni£ Law Comm'n 2010)
("Duty of Impartiality"); Scott and Asher on Trusts§ 17.15 (5th ed. 1995) ("Duty of Impartiality").
60 See, e.g., In re JMW Auto Sales, 494494 B.R. 877, 893 (Banlcr. S.D. Tex. 2013).
61 CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) ("The fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders
are well as creditors.... One of the painful facts ofbanlcruptcy is that the interests of shareholders become
subordinated to the interests of creditors."). Note even the Supreme Court's vacillation between shifting
57
58
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role of debtor in possession is a broad one with a host of beneficiaries. It is the number
and diversity of beneficiaries of this fiduciary duty that causes its undoing as a useful
concept for analysis for conduct:'62
I. SECURED CREDITORS

Notwithstanding this broad obligation to maximize the interests of everyone, there are
repeat scenarios in which constituencies conflict, and bankruptcy law has struggled to
apply "winners" of the fiduciary duty. Consider the tension immanent in the strong-arm
clause and its consequences for the trustee's duty of loyalty. This avoiding power pits
secured creditor against unsecured creditor, both apparent beneficiaries of the trustee's
loyalty. Moreover, an unsecured creditor generally lacks standing to pursue an avoidance action. Thus, only if the trustee decides to move forward will the secured creditor
be at risk. Why should a trustee expend time and effort litigating against one beneficiary
for the benefit of another (more likely, others) ?63
Nothing in the Code dictates an obligation to do so other than the general command
to examine claims, 64 which could subsume an obligation to examine the perfected status
of a secured claim. Yet case law has created just such a duty, albeit tempered. Indeed,
most cases considering the matter do not see secured and unsecured creditors as equal
subjects of the trustee's protections. On the contrary, they say that secured creditors can
look out for themselves, and thus the trustee's "primary" obligation is to unsecured
creditors. 65 This approach is tempered, however, by a plausibility threshold, suggesting
the trustee's obligation is not to rack up fees scouring every single lien on the estate, but
only when some initial indicia of litigability is raised. The bankruptcy rules reflect this
thinking. 66 (Of course, this tempering of the trustee's obligation is coupled with an
unsecured creditors committee in Chapter 11, which has a greater watchdog role in
policing the conduct of the "trustee" that is a DIP. 67 ) The corollary, then, is that if the
validity of a secured creditor's perfected status is doubtful, the trustee, acting for the
unsecured creditors, should object.
The strong-arm clause perhaps is a special case: What's the point of having the strongarm avoiding power that only the trustee has standing to implement if the trustee has no

exclusively to creditors versus shifting diffusely to creditors in addition to shareholders. As one of the
bankruptcy bar's senior statesmen observes, the corporate board retains residual duties even when a
Chapter 11 trustee is appointed. Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor
in Possession's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 543, 547 (1992).
62

Kelch, supra note 20, at 1336.
64 Id.§ 704(a)(5).
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (tying trustee's compensation to recovery).
65 In re Dinh, 80 B.R. 819, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987) ("[I]t is a fundamental concept in bankruptcy
that a trustee's primary duty is to the unsecured creditors rather than to the secured creditors. The
secured creditors ... should be able to look to their collateral for satisfaction of their claims:'); In re
Schwen's, Inc., 19 B.R. 681, 694 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) ("Secured creditors have a duty and responsibility
to monitor the bankruptcy proceedings and to keep informed of the action taken with respect to property in which they claim an interest:').
66 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f).
67 u. U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103.
63
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fiduciary obligation to use it?68 But the case law talking about the trustee's "primary"
duty to the unsecured creditors and not the secureds is far from limited to the strongarm clause. Another area in which the trustee's obligations to a secured creditor arise
involves the maintenance and preservation of collateral.6' Recall that the bankruptcy
estate comprises all property of the debtor, even that fully encumbered by consensual
lien. Why would a trustee want to hold onto such property, let alone incur expenses to
maintain it? The short answer is, he doesn't, and, indeed, often abandons it back to the
secured creditor (if the secured creditor doesn't beat him to the punch with a lift-stay
motion). 70 But unless and until that happens, the secured creditor cannot take the
property back without violating the automatic stay. 71
So what happens in the interim if the property requires upkeep? Consider a property
insurance premium: Should the trustee pay it? If the estate is deeply insolvent, perhaps
even to the point where recovery of the trustee's own fees are in question, there is no
incentive to waste scarce funds on collateral that will not generate any return to the
estate (recall the trustee himself takes fees out of the estate). Congress has included Section
506(c) to allow the trustee to "surcharge" the collateral with such expenses, exactly to
combat this economic disincentive. 72 But Section 506 does not answer the question of
fiduciary duty. While the question might be seen as pertaining to the duty of care (Does
the trustee have to do X?), it really is a question of the duty of loyalty (Does the trustee
have to do Xfor Y?). 73 Section 506 simply states what to do if the trustee does incur the
cost of the premium. But it doesn't answer the fiduciary question: Must the trustee act
because of his fiduciary duty to the secured creditor?74
Some courts have said so. "Procuring insurance would ordinarily be an integral part
of the trustee's duty [to secured creditors] ."75 They build upon general principles that the
"fiduciary duty [flows] to all creditors, not just the unsecured creditors."76 On the other
hand, contrary cases pick favorites and hold that although the duty extends to all creditors,
the "primary duty" is to fight for the unsecured creditors and not the secured creditors.77
68 Cf. In re Pearson Indus., 178 B.R. 753, 767 (Bankr. C.D. ill. 1995) (no duty to pursue voidable preference absent benefit to estate); see generally In re Nettel Corp., 364 B.R. 433, 441-442 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006)
(taking capacious definition of"estate" to include secured creditor).
70 Id. §§ 362(d), 554.
"
11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(2).
71 See, e.g., In re Bums, 503 B.R. 666, 673-675, 68o (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2013) (holding refrigerator
repossession willful stay violation).
72 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (requiring expenses "benefit" secured creditor).
73 Substantial case law holds that the trustee is not supposed to represent any individual creditor, but
the collective. See, e.g., In re DigitalBridge Holdings, Inc., No. 10-34499, 2015 WL 5766761 at •4 (Bankr.
D. Utah Sept. 30, 2015) (holding trustee pursuing adversary proceeding must represent all or no creditors
but may not represent only some). Relatedly, the trustee has no obligation to "save" individual creditors
and indeed must object to late-filed claims. See, e.g., In re Lyon, No. 11-50343, 2011 WL 5299229, at ,.2
(Bankr. W.D. N.C. Nov. 2, 2011).
74 Cf. Sitkoff & Dukeminier, supra note 59, at 595 ("Difference Between Power and Duty").
75 In re Kinross Mfg. Corp., 174 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994).
76 In re Troy Dodson Constr. Co., 993 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993).
77 Some go so far to abjure any duty to secureds. See, e.g., In re NETtel Corp., Inc., 364 B.R. 433, 441
(Bankr. D.C. 2006) (holding trustee's fiduciary obligations "run only to a debtor's unsecured creditors:').
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Thus, some have held precisely the opposite: when no value will to flow to the estate
(as the secured creditor will reap all the collateral's benefit), the trustee has no duty to
expend estate funds to procure insurance. "The secured creditor must exercise reasonable diligence to protect the property serving as security. The trustee must also exercise
diligence to conserve the assets of the bankruptcy estate, but he is not relegated to the
role of'babysitter' for the secured creditors:'78 These courts believe the secured creditor
can just as easily-more easily, in fact-pay the premium if it wants the collateral to be
insured. 79 In sum, whatever the jurisprudential platitudes about trustees being fiduciaries to "all creditors," when loyalty-dividing issues of secured creditor versus unsecured
creditors arise, it seems that some fiduciary conflicts are resolved in favor of unsecured
creditors on the backs of the secureds, with many courts unapologetically touting the
trustee's "primary" obligation toward the unsecureds. One court has gone so far to call
secured creditors "the trustee's statutory adversaries:' 80
Normative theory is sadly beyond the scope of this chapter, but a few quick explanations
for this jurisprudential line ofbeneficiary stratification present themselves. On a redistributive impulses level, it could be that bankruptcy judges generally favor the unsecured
creditor as the "little guy;' given the numerous Code provisions that treat secured credit so
favorably; 81 they believe that otherwise hapless unsecureds need all the help they can get
(or, more precisely, in a near-zero-sum distributive bankruptcy world, the secured creditors don't need the trustee's help as much as a zealous fiduciary). Or it could be an armchair
empirical assumption that unsecured creditors of ah insolvent estate are often the "residual claimants;' and hence the fulcrum class to whom the trustee's obligations ought be
owed in cases of inter-creditor conflict. This assumption has been rightly questioned. 82
For example, it is more likely to be true in consumer cases than in uncertain corporate
valuation cases. Whatever the justification, a strand of fiduciary law may be emerging:
the trustee is "more beneficial" for unsecured creditors than secured. 83 But it is contested.
II. PRIORITY UNSECURED CREDITORS

Slicing the bologna even finer, what happens when there are conflicts among unsecured creditors inter se? Section 507 accords special priority to certain unsecured
In re Dinh, So B.R. 819, 823 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987).
See In re Peckinpaugh, 50 B.R. 865, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (holding otherwise "would shift
the Trustee's role from custodian to investment manager thereby encouraging secured creditors to avoid
the responsibility for their investments").
80 In re J.F.D. Enterprises, 223 B.R. 610,628 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998).
81 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 1129(b )(1).
82 See Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1390 (2007) ("We would be astonished to hear that VISA has claimed a breach of
fiduciary duty when one of its subprime customers started a risky new business or took up skydiving.").
Hu and Westbrook also challenge the casual assumption that corporate creditors prefer less risky investment decisions than stockholders. Id. at 1351.
83 The ostensible "duty" to maximize distributions is not found in Section 704's duty list. The Supreme
Court in Weintraub talked about the trustee's "seeking to maximize the value of the estate," CFTC v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353 (1985), which the Seventh Circuit economically glosses as maximizing "net
assets" after considering collection costs. In re Taianan Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1995). It
receives mention in the trustee's handbook. Rhodes, supra note 28, at 168 n.92.
78
79
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creditors' claims.84 Does the trustee have an obligation to investigate these claims, too,
perhaps to uncover whether priority assertions are trumped up? Or may the trustee
take a passive role unless and until someone pipes up? Here, the case law is scanter, so
I reached out to some bankruptcy judges, trustees, and counsel for anecdotal guidance.
I am informed that while the issue doesn't arise frequently and that many overworked
trustees usually just take claims as given if nobody fusses, occasionally trustees do dig in
on a bold creditor proclamation of priority status. One sage colleague who has worked
as a trustee in complex cases for decades said this:
As to priority claims, I have to object to a number of claims in which the creditor
alleges priority. An unsecured creditor will often file as a priority claim hoping that
I will miss the lack of priority. Wage claimants will often overstate their priority
when wages are generally limited to priority for ninety days prior to filing. Usually
I am the person filing a claim objection because of claimed priority or as an administrative expense claim.85

Why would there not be the same enthusiasm to go after priority creditors as secured
creditors? If the theoretical foundation for the rule that unsecured creditors get
"primary" trustee loyalty over secured creditors is the unsecured creditors' occupation
as the fulcrum class of residual claimants, then one would expect an equal application to
general unsecureds when a conflict is with a priority unsecured: the trustee should presumably look out for residual claimants and fight the priority claim. Yet this does not
seem to be uniformly the case, at least based on my anecdotal survey, which might be
evidence for the judicially favored redistribution hypothesis. Many priority unsecured
creditors are from disempowered constituencies (domestic support, employees, etc.).86
Or perhaps simply trustees remember that they, too, receive priority repayment! 87 The
point is that once again, fiduciary law is doing limited work, with no uniform case law
on how to resolve these conflicts.
III. DEBTOR

Finally, conflicts between creditors and the debtor seem to run in the opposite direction.
Here, cases repeatedly hold that the trustee's fiduciary loyalty does not flow to the
debtor, even though technically the debtor is the estate's ultimate residual beneficiary. 88
For example, even though not in the trustee's list of responsibilities under Section 704,
courts have created a trustee duty to scrutinize (and if indicated, object to) the debtor's

u.s.c. § 507.
Email from Christopher Redmond, Esq., Partner, Husch Blackwell, to author (June 14, 2017, 8:45
EST) (on file with author). Chris estimates claims objection incidence as 95% of the time the trustee, 4%
the debtor, and 1% some other party (e.g., another creditor). Id This obligation to kick the beneficiary's
tires might surprise trust lawyers; it stems from a deep-rooted bankruptcy norm of pro rata distribution.
86 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), (a)(3).
87 Id § (a)(2). Note that the compensation structure for trustees incentivius recoveries for the unsecured creditors, with no special treatment for priority. See id. § 326(a); d. id § 507(a)(1)(C) (special
trustee priority for domestic support creditors).
88 Id§ 726.
84 11

85
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exemptions. 89 This cannot be explained away by the Code's instruction to trustees to
object when advisable to the debtor's discharge, 90 because trustees have an equal if not
more explicit statutory instruction to examine creditors' claims. 91 Courts upholding
this obligation candidly admit it comes indirectly from the Code, gamely trying various
hooks. 92 The weak statutory foundations mean that courts are driven by what they see as
the trustee's duty to unsecured creditors, and to work for unsecured creditors against the
debtor when their interests disalign. At least sometimes, therefore, conflicting demands
on a trustee's loyalty are not so difficult to resolve: the debtor loses. 93 Fiduciary duty,
however, is not guiding, but providing constructed ex post justification, for resolution
of this conflict.

3. Debtor-in-Possession Redux: A Pragmatic Refocus?
The foregoing loyalty discussion has considered the typical Chapter 7 case with an
appointed trustee. The Chapter 11 (DIP) context presents a noteworthy contrast: where
fiduciary law, beyond ritual incantations, does even less work than structural provisions
of the bankruptcy system that may be designed as a pragmatic mitigation of these
loyalty conflicts.
Consider that the DIP-controlled debtor nominally holds the same fiduciary duties
to creditors, albeit with some exceptions. First, the DIP (absent self-loathing) is unlikely
to vigorously pursue actions against the debtor. Fortunately, the paradigmatic case from
consumer bankruptcy of trustee v. debtor-an exemption fight-won't arise in a corporate
Chapter 11 because corporations don't get exemptions. Nonetheless, it would be foolish
to deny the policy tension with the DIP serving as fiduciary for often antithetically situated stakeholders; few Chapter 11 debtors enjoy rosy relations with their creditors when
they file for bankruptcy. 94 The Code responds to this structural tension with some
built-in safety valves. First, the Code allows for DIP removal for "cause;' which includes
incompetence and misconduct. 95 Although incompetence more aptly invokes the fiduciary duty of care, the duty of loyalty is also implicated. For example, a glaring security

89 In re Dreibelbis, No. 14-61483, 2015 WL 3536102, at *4 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2015) (calling duty
"routine").
90 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(6).
91 Id. § 704(a)(5).
92 In re Bell, 225 F.3d 203, 221 ("The duty to review and, if necessary object to, claimed exemptions is
nowhere specifically mentioned-although it is subsumed within the general duty to 'investigate the
financial affairs of the debtor:" (quoting § 707(a)(4)); see also In re Edmonston, 107 F.3d 74, 76-77
(1st Cir. 1997) (referencing§ 707(a)(1)'s obligation as "implicitly" providing basis for duty).
93 No court wants to go so far as to say the trustee owes no loyalty duties to the debtor at all. Cf. CFTC
v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,353 (1985) (corporate debtor's loyalty duty is to the "corporation"). And some
courts have taken the debtor as co-beneficiary of fiduciary duty seriously. See In re Central Ice Cream
Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (faulting trustee for taking easy settlement on appeal of judgment; complaining trustee was unduly focused on creditors' risk-aversion, not debtor's shareholder's
residual interest).
94 Some suggest the tension is so stark as to make the fiduciary obligations questionable. See Kelch,
supra note 20, at 1351-1352, 1352 n.131.
95 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
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interest imperfection-perhaps a lapsed financing statement-not pursued by the
DIP would surely ground a motion to appoint a trustee as inexplicable secured creditor
favoritism. 116
Now, who would cajole the DIP to bring such a motion?117 This question segues into
the second Chapter 11 safeguard: the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. As its
name suggests, the Creditors Committee participates formally and may access the DIP's
records.118 It can weigh in on pending litigation and can even recommend approval/
disapproval of a reorganization plan (and, when the exclusivity period expires, propose
its own plan).1111 Perhaps most importantly, it draws funding from the estate to employ
counsel to scrutinize the DIP's actions-a considerable henhouse check on the fox. 100
Cases have explicitly held that the Committee can bring litigation otherwise available
to the DIP if the DIP wrongly refuses to do so. 101
A final structural check is the bankruptcy court itself, which, by statute, must approve
certain transactions that outside bankruptcy would escape scrutiny. For example, sale/
use of estate property outside the ordinary course of business, or use of cash collateral,
requires court approval. 102 Tuus, numerous Code provisions seem designed to acknowledge the intrinsic "external" loyalty tension of the DIP model's fiduciary obligation to
erstwhile adversaries. These offsetting checks also address "internal" loyalty conflicts
by inserting the judge as arbiter, thus serving as a pragmatic response to the DIP's
conflicting allegiances (as opposed to relying on litigation to delineate the scope of the
fiduciary duty ofloyalty).103

IV.

REMEDIES

Among the more convoluted topics in bankruptcy are the rules for when trustees can be
sued for breaches of their duties (fiduciary and others). The case law is often contradictory, but some coherence emerges, and there is a recurrent theme of trustee solicitude,
likely reflecting a recognition of the impossibility of the trustee serving every divergent
constituent satisfactorily.
To begin, however, we should pause to consider nonlitigation sanctions. The U.S.
Trustee's office can strike trustees from their rolls and so repeat play/reputational

96 Cf. In re Biolitec, Inc., No. 13-m57, 2013 WL 1352302, at *9 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2013) (appointing
trustee when DIP declined to pursue glaring secured creditor preferences).
97 Note that in Chapter 13, there is dispute whether the debtor or standing trustee has standing to
pursue lien avoidance given the Chapter 13 debtor's vesting in many of the trustee's powers. Compare In
re Cohen, 305 B.R. 886,900 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (debtor), with In re Binghi, 299 B.R. 300, 306 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003) (standing trustee).
98 11 U.S.C. § 1103.
100 Id. §§ 330, 1103.
" Id. § 1121(c).
101 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 319 B.R. u8, 132 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).
102 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1), (c)(2).
103 See generally Bienenstock, supra note 61 (cataloging other DIP loyalty checks).
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constraints provide strong administrative discipline. 104 And trustees are required to
post a bond for exercising their duties "faithful [ly] :• which trigger forfeiture upon proper
showing. 105 Thus, even aside from case law, there are nonlitigation constraints on
trustee fiduciary behavior. Nonetheless, litigation abounds. Perhaps recognizing the
conflict-laden challenges trustees structurally face (and the baseline unhappiness of
creditors in bankruptcy), numerous protective doctrines for trustees exist that should be
understood before considering the grounds upon which trustees can be sued for breach.

A. Defense: Immunities and Bars
The principal issue in trustee litigation is the trustee's personal liability. The trustee does,
however, have standing to sue and be sued on behalf of the estate in her official capacity,
which can be addressed quickly. 106
1.

Official Capacity Bar: The Barton Doctrine

The two types oflawsuits the trustee officially pursues are actions of the debtor-causes
to which the trustee succeeds as plaintiff-and actions for all creditors' collective benefit,
such as fraudulent conveyance suits. 107 Lawsuits against the trustee in his official capacity face a jurisdictional common law bar called the Barton rule. In Barton v. Barbour, the
Supreme Court established that suits against trustees in connection with estate administration require the appointing court's leave. 108 For example, a state court tort action
against the receiver in her official capacity had to be dismissed absent the receiver court's
leave. 109 Thus, as a pleading matter, most putative plaintiffs sue the trustee in their
personal capacities. no
2.

Personal Capacity Bar: The Derivative Immunity Doctrine

Even if sued personally, a trustee can always assert immunity, which will also be grounds
for denying Barton leave. This "absolute quasi-judicial immunity;• or immunity "derived"
from the trustee's appointing court, immunizes the trustee from suit within the scope
of her official capacities. m Courts uniformly extending this immunity to bankruptcy

28 C.F.R. § 58.6 (outlining suspension and termination procedures).
U.S.C. § 322. Trustees (and their sureties) do indeed get burnt. See In re Schooler, 449 B.R. 502,
517 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
106 11 U.S.C. § 323; see also id.§ 322(c) (immunizing trustee for debtor's malfeasance).
107 Id. §§ 541, 548.
108 104 U.S. 126, 136-137 (1881).
109 See Villegas v. Schmidt, 788 F.3d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying Barton doctrine).
11 ° Congress has a statutory overlay, 28 U.S.C. § 959(a), which clarifies that trustees/DIPs can be sued
for "carrying on business:• This is refinement, not abrogation, of Barton, because it merely confers ordinary
jurisdiction for civil suits (e.g., if the DIP enters and then breaches a contract to supply goods). See In re
Crown Vantage, 421 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[Section 959's] limited exception applies only if the
trustee or other officer is actually operating the business.... ").
111 Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 E2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987).
10 •

105 11
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trustees build upon Supreme Court precedents on judicial immunity,112 which protect
the free exercise of official discretion without fear oflitigation. m For example, trustees
have an obligation (clearly institutional, not fiduciary) to refer to criminal prosecution conduct they believe is suspicious and so enjoy an absolute bar to malicious prosecution·suit.114
Not all exercises of trustee authority trigger derivative immunity. Which ones
do depends upon classification along an "administrative/functional" to "judiciaV
discretionary" continuum, stemming from the Court's decision in Forrester v. White, 115
as refined by a more categorical historical two-part test in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson.116
This division follows from the trustee's immunity's conceptual origin in judicial immunity, as not all judges' actions enjoy absolute judicial immunity. (Forrester involved the
judge demoting a probation officer, which was not an exercise of judicial power needing
protection. 117) Bankruptcy trustees, like judges, are "hybrid official[s]" who exercise some
judicial-discretionary functions but also many administrative tasks, thus requiring
case-by-case immunity analysis. 118

3. Scope of the Duty Bar: The McNulta Doctrine (and

Instructions Defense)
Moreover, even if the trustee's authority is on the nonjudicial side of the ForresterAntoine ledger and hence unprotected by derivative immunity, the trustee still enjoys
alternative immunity from personal suit under the McNulta doctrine. Dating back to
the Supreme Court case McNulta v. Lochridge, 119 this additional immunity depends
on the plaintiff: third parties are treated more dismissively than creditors to whom the
trustee owes a fiduciary duty. 120 If a third party sues the trustee in her personal capacity,
the trustee can assert McNulta, which immunizes the trustee for actions performed
within the scope of his duties. 121 The only exception is ultra vires conduct, i.e., that the
trustee was acting outside the scope of his assigned responsibilities. Such cases are
uncommon, but always interesting. 122
112 See, e.g., Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981); Howard v. Leonard, 101 B.R. 421,
423 (D. N.J. 1989) ("[T)rustee's immunity is derived from that afforded to the bankruptcy judge.... ");
Gonzalez v. Musso, No. 08-CV-3026, 2008 WL 3194179, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2008) ("[T)rustee will
enjoy absolute immunity so long as he does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, or at least acts
under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge:' (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
113 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) ("[T]hreat ofliability can create perverse incentives
that operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties.").
114 18 U.S.C. § 3057(a).
115 484 U.S. 219, 227-228 (1988).
116 508 U.S. 429, 432, 436 (1993) (assessing "immunity historically accorded [to) the relevant official"
and whether official's discretionary judgments are "functionally comparable to that of a judge") (internal
citations omitted).
117 484 U.S. at 230 (noting judge might enjoy qualified immunity).
118 In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002).
119 141 U.S. 327 (1891).
120 See id. at 332.
121 See, e.g., In re Markos Gurnee P'ship, 182 B.R. 211, 216-217 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
122 See, e.g., In re United Eng'g. & Contracting Co., 151 N.Y.S. 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915) (finding trustee
personally liable with no McNulta immunity for horses run amok absent authorization to run business).
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Finally, even if the trustee's conduct is not immune under the foregoing doctrines,
there is still one final bite at the apple: immunity by virtue of court approval. This doctrine harks back to the seminal case of Morris v. Darrow, in which the Supreme Court in
finding a trustee liable for breach of fiduciary duty chided the trustee for not following
"well established" practice in trust law of "seek[ing] instructions from the court, given
upon notice to creditors and other interested parties, as to matters which involve difficult questions of judgment."123 Building on this rationale, modem courts have granted
trustees immunity when acting "with the explicit approval of a bankruptcy court ... as
long as there has been full and frank disclosure to creditors and the court." 124

B. Offense: Standard of Care for Breach
So what is left for a trustee to be sued upon in his personal capacity? Breach of fiduciary
duty. This is only available to "second party" plaintiffs, e.g., creditors to whom the bankruptcy trustee owes fiduciary obligations. But the extent of the trustee's duty is once
again unclear due to convoluted precedent. The cryptic Mosser case is to blame, and has
caused a three-way circuit split. In Mosser, a railroad reorganization receiver poorly supervised his employees, who ended up trading in securities they sold the estate. The case is
interesting because the trustee appeared hapless: he made no personal gain himself, just
the faithless agents did In fact, it's not clear the estate itselflost money (the agents "merely"
profited, although the Court acknowledged the estate's foregone opportunity). 125
In holding the trustee liable, the Court used language that has puzzled subsequent
analysts: "[W]e see no room for the operation of principles of negligence in a case in
which conduct has been knowingly authorized" 126 In the Court's view, this was an easy
case of surcharging the trustee with personal liability because the agents were not going
behind his back, but following a plan to trade securities the trustee himself innocently
but unwisely approved But "no room for negligence" could be read to mean that negligence
should not be the relevant standard, only something higher, before a trustee is personally liable. Or it could mean that it was deferring the question of what level of culpability
would need to be shown for a transgression of the duty of care, evincing trustee solicitude with comments like "[c]ourt[s] are quite likely to protect trustees against heavy
liabilities for disinterested mistakes in business judgment" from "obstreperous creditors
aided by hindsight:" 127 Or something else.
A three-way circuit split has indeed emerged trying to divine the standard for trustee
liability-each claiming to draw support from Mosser's terse opinion-with some courts
seeing Mosser as requiring knowing/intentional wrongful conduct to predicate trustee

123

341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951).

124

In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d 1, 8 (ist Cir. 1999).
See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951).

125

126

Id.

i27

Id. at 274.
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personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty; 128 some requiring mere negligence in
the discharge of duties (Mosser uses the fiduciary-laden term "surcharge"); 1211 and still
others taking a middle ground of gross negligence (following the ignored recommendations ofthe 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission). 130 Someday, albeit perhaps
a long way off, the Supreme Court will clear this up.

V.

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES WITH

FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN INSOLVENCY
As said, Section 704 is too long to explore in detail, but quick mention can be made of

less prominent duties sometimes considered fiduciary. Specifically, the Code provides
an explicit duty to account, 131 a duty to collect and preserve assets, 132 a duty to keep
records, 133 and a general duty to inform and respond 134 The open-court aspect ofbankruptcy lessens the need of fiduciary law to compel free information flow, 135 and, indeed,
this open-court nature renders any "duty to inquire" of the needs of represented litigants inapposite. 136 The trustee also may statutorily delegate operation of the estate
to professionals, 137 but must submit a written resignation to the U.S. Trustee to resign
effectively. 138 Case law has generally held that trustees may not delegate the "essential
decision-making responsibility" of administering a case. m
Finally, revisiting the DIP's fiduciary duty in the (common) context of a corporate
debtor is in order before concluding. General corporate law has its own concerns of agency
challenges and temptations of corporate management exercising their fiduciary duties for
shareholders.140 Under influential Delaware law, however, this duty to shareholders shifts
to encompassing creditors as well when the corporation enters the zone ofinsolvency. 141
Different systems saddle corporate fiduciaries with analogous responsibilities. 142 While
128 See, e.g., In re Chicago Pac. Corp, 773 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 198s). This line of cases has been criticized
for conflating trustee's personal liability standards (finding the willful/intentional threshold required)
with the trustee's liability threshold for official liability, which, bizarrely, would be recoverable against
the estate. See, e.g., McCullough, supra note 28, at 177-179 (citing E. Allan Tiller, Personal Liability of
Trustees and Receivers In Bankruptcy, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 75, 100 (1979)).
129 See, e.g., In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.3d 1339, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983).
130 See, e.g., In re Smyth, 207 R3d 758, 762 (sth Cir. 2000).
m 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(a)(2), (9).
132 Id at (a)(1).
134 Id. at (a)(7).
135 Id. at (a)(10).
153 Id. at (a)(8).
136 See, e.g., Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Mass. App. 1991).
137 11 U.S.C. § 327.
138 See Handbook, supra note 33, at § 2.J, 6.
139 In re Computer Learning Ctrs. Inc., :285 B.R 191, 207 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002).
140 See generally Adolph A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1932). On the current state of corporate law, see Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate
Law, this volume.
141 See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 82, at 1338 n.55. This doctrine finds historical pedigree in the trust
fund doctrine that, prior to statutory regulation, policed improper corporate dividends from insolvent
debtors. Id. at 1332-1333.
142 Id. at 1383 n.226, 1400 n.299.
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this doctrine has undergone some revision (and retrenchment) in recent cases, the
proposition remains that shareholders lose their exclusive beneficiary status when this
"zone" has been entered (which now appears to be restricted to just straight "insolvency"). 143
Legions of commentators in the corporate field have attacked and defended this dutyshifting rule, 144 and the bankruptcy community has had its share of insights, too, 145
including Professors Hu and Westbrook. They point out the poor fit of expanding fiduciary obligations to multiple stakeholders at state law, which they contend is ill-equipped
institutionally to handle policing duties to multiple and antagonistic beneficiaries. Rather,
say Hu and Westbrook, expanding fiduciary duties to creditors when a corporation
becomes insolvent (actually or just "zonally") should be abandoned No duty to creditors
should obtain unless and until the debtor files a bankruptcy petition. 146 This proposal is
grounded in a belief that the bankruptcy system is better suited to handle the endemic
conflicts of interest between corporate constituencies through the various bankruptcyspecific mechanisms discussed previously, such as the corporation-funded creditors
committee, the ability to displace wayward fiduciaries with an external trustee, and,
most importantly, bankruptcy judge oversight, aided by an automatic stay that freezes
all creditor conduct and corrals matters into her courtroom. 147

VI.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the generalizability of the Hu/Westbrook proposal beyond Chapter 11, it is
certainly the case that the Bankruptcy Code does indeed have many safeguards designed
to confront conflicting creditor incentives, both against the DIP and inter se, in the
swirling chaos of insolvency. While bankruptcy courts aren't perfect, they are at least
used to shifting allegiances and disalignments of interest in their everyday dockets.
The Bankruptcy Code allows transparency of the process, committee watchdogs, and
replacement of the DIP fiduciary of "internal'' loyalty with an external trustee all as an

143
See id. at 1344 (explaining seminal Giahwalla case and nominal difference regarding derivative
claims).
144 See, e.g., Neil Ruben, Note, Duty to Creditors in Insolvency and the Zone of Insolvency: Delaware
and the Alternatives, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 333, 351-557 (2010) (canvassing arguments for/against creditor
derivative standing).
145
See Kelch, supra note 20, at 1350-1363 (discussing inherent conflict). Kelch proposes a prescriptive
taxonomy that includes "Group Favoritism" (pick one constituency); "Diffuse Loyalty" (help everyone,
through the corporation); and even "Stakeholder-Mediation'' (remain neutral and transparent about
fights). Kelch himself supports an Adversarial Model, contending that DIP discharge of corporate fiduciary duties is impossible.
146 See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 82, passim.
147 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 554. Hu and Westbrook indeed question whether corporate duties provide any
meaningful discipline at all See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 82, at 1391 n.260.
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attempt to manage the challenging fiduciary obligation of "internal" loyalty in the tense
context of general default. It may even do so more effectively than explicit litigation
reliance on the fiduciary duties ofloyalty and impartiality (with protective doctrines to
spare the trustee from hindsight). Perhaps scholars of fiduciary duties in high-conflict
environments could learn from bankruptcy's pragmatic approach.
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